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Financial incentives are widely used in health behavior interventions. However, self-determination theory posits that emphasizing
ﬁnancial incentives can have negative consequences if experienced as controlling. Feeling controlled into performing a behavior
tends to reduce enjoyment and undermine maintenance after ﬁnancial contingencies are removed (the undermining eﬀect). We
assessed participants’ context-speciﬁc ﬁnancial motivation to participate in the Make Better Choices trial—a trial testing four
diﬀerent strategies for improving four health risk behaviors: low fruit and vegetable intake, high saturated fat intake, low physical
activity, and high sedentary screen time. The primary outcome was overall healthy lifestyle change; weight loss was a secondary
outcome. Financial incentives were contingent upon meeting behavior goals for 3 weeks and became contingent upon merely
providing data during the 4.5-month maintenance period. Financial motivation for participation was assessed at baseline using
a7 - i t e ms c a l e( α = .97). Across conditions, a main eﬀect of ﬁnancial motivation predicted a steeper rate of weight regained
during the maintenance period, t(165) = 2.15, P = .04. Furthermore, ﬁnancial motivation and gender interacted signiﬁcantly in
predicting maintenance of healthy diet and activity changes, t(160) = 2.42, P = .016, such that ﬁnancial motivation had a more
deleterious inﬂuence among men. Implications for practice and future research on incentivized lifestyle and weight interventions
are discussed.
1.Introduction
The use of ﬁnancial incentives is a strategy to motivate
healthy behavior change that has become routine practice
over the past decade. A 2008 survey of major US employers
found that over 70% of employee wellness programs were
using ﬁnancial incentives to encourage participation and/or
performance[1].Inparticular,ﬁnancialincentiveshavebeen
increasingly used to help motivate complex healthy behavior
changes, such as increasing physical activity, improving diet,
and in weight loss interventions more broadly. The use
of (nonfood) rewards in obesity treatment has also been
recommended by the World Health Organization [2].
Over the past 30 years, health behavior interventionists
have identiﬁed a number of factors that inﬂuence the eﬃcacy
of ﬁnancial incentives for initiating weight loss, as well
as physical activity and improvements in diet [3–20]. For
example, Volpp and colleagues recently published a high
impact paper demonstrating that low-intensity intervention
pairedwithsmallﬁnancialincentivescanproduceimpressive
initiation of weight loss [18]. However, to date, far less
attention has been paid to the issue of weight and health
behavior change maintenance after ﬁnancial incentives are
removed. A small fraction of the extant studies have assessed
maintenance, and those that have typically reported very
limited success [14–20]. In the Volpp et al. study [18]a t
the end of the 16-week incentivized phase, both ﬁnancial
incentive groups lost signiﬁcantly more weight than did the
control group; however, 12 weeks into a maintenance phase
the incentive groups had regained much of the weight they
hadinitiallylost,andthediﬀerencesbetweenconditionswere
no longer signiﬁcant. A follow-up trial explicitly designed
to use ﬁnancial incentives to achieve extended weight loss
lengthened the incentivized phase to 24 weeks and reduced2 Journal of Obesity
the maintenance phase to 8 weeks. In this case, the diﬀerence
between incentive and control groups remained signiﬁcant
at 8 weeks but was no longer signiﬁcant after 12 weeks
of maintenance [19]. A 2007 systematic review of ﬁnancial
incentives in treatments for obesity/overweight included
nine studies with follow-up of one year or more. Results
showed that incentives produced no improvement in weight
loss maintenance at 12 or 18 months, after the incentives
were removed. In fact, there was a trend toward weight regain
above baseline at 30-month follow-up [20].
Self-determination theory (SDT) is a theory of motiva-
tion that may provide some insight into why weight loss
interventions emphasizing ﬁnancial incentives have strug-
gledtoachievesuccessfulmaintenance[21,22].Atthecoreof
SDTistheconceptofautonomousmotivation, characterized
by feeling free and acting for the sake of rewards that are
inherent to the activity itself. This inherent reward could
be positive emotions, such as interest and enjoyment (i.e.,
intrinsic motivation), or the satisfaction associated with
action that is personally meaningful (i.e., identiﬁed extrinsic
motivation). Importantly, an emerging body of evidence
shows that autonomous motivation is positively related to
persistence and maintenance of healthy lifestyle changes.
Speciﬁcally, self-reported autonomous motivation has been
showntopredictgreatermaintenanceofphysicalactivityand
weight loss [23, 24]. In a 3-year randomized controlled trial,
Silva and colleagues contrasted an intervention designed to
promote autonomous motivation for exercise and weight
management to a general health education control condition
[25–28]. After 3 years, the intervention designed to support
autonomous motivation produced signiﬁcantly better main-
tenance of both exercise and weight loss, relative to control,
and the eﬀects were mediated by autonomous motivation
(both intrinsic motivation and identiﬁed extrinsic motiva-
tion) [29].
Many studies have demonstrated that extrinsic rewards
(including ﬁnancial incentives) tend to undermine intrinsic
motivation, an eﬀect often referred to as “the undermining
eﬀect.” A meta-analysis of 128 studies on the undermining
eﬀect found that performance-contingent rewards increase
extrinsic motivation while the contingency is in place, but
at the expense of decreasing intrinsic motivation [30].
Moreover, the resulting decrease in intrinsic motivation
persists well after the contingency is removed (i.e., poor
maintenance). SDT posits that the negative relation between
extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation can be explained
by the fact that contingent rewards have a tendency to feel
subtly controlling, thwarting peoples’ psychological need for
autonomy, and distracting them from potentially enjoyable
aspects of the targeted activity.
This led us to wonder—is undermining responsible for
the pattern of poor maintenance observed in weight loss
and lifestyle interventions that have emphasized ﬁnancial
incentives? On the one hand, the general pattern of poor
maintenance observed across pay-for-performance weight
loss and lifestyle intervention trials has been consistent with
the undermining eﬀect. On the other hand there are some
noteworthy diﬀerences between the ways extrinsic rewards
have typically been used in the context of experiments inves-
tigating the undermining eﬀect versus how ﬁnancial incen-
tives have typically been used in weight loss interventions.
Few studies of the undermining eﬀect have tested the impact
of extrinsic rewards for longer than a few hours or days; by
contrast, weight loss interventions are typically interesting in
assessing maintenance weeks or months later. Further, the
typical laboratory experiment investigating the undermining
eﬀect has involved administration of a reward at a single
time point, leading Deci et al. [30] to conclude from their
meta-analysis that more studies are needed “that examine
repeated administration of rewards over time” (p. 650). The
pay-for-performance weight loss interventions conducted by
Volpp and others have typically involved repeated payments
for weight loss achieved incrementally over the course
of multiple weeks. Furthermore, studies of undermining
eﬀects have typically involved rewarding participants for
a behavior that is intrinsically motivated at baseline, that
is, behaviors that are interesting or enjoyable (e.g., Soma
puzzles). In the case of obesity interventions, participants’
baselinelevelsofintrinsicmotivationforeatinghealthyfoods
andbeingphysicallyactiveislikelymodest.Collectively,these
diﬀerences introduce reasonable skepticism about whether
the undermining eﬀect is relevant in the context of weight
lossandlifestyleinterventionsandsupporttheneedformore
research on this topic.
The present research is intended to oﬀer an early
contribution toward exploring the question of motiva-
tional undermining in the context of the Make Better
Choicestrial—astudytestingintensivelifestyleinterventions
designedtopromotehealthchangesindietandactivityusing
performance-contingent ﬁnancial incentives (in addition to
coaching and support from mobile technology). Based on
the self-determination theory, we hypothesized (H1) that
self-reported ﬁnancial motivation (i.e., motivation derived
from performance-contingent ﬁnancial incentives oﬀered
for eating healthy and being physically active) would be
negatively related to maintenance of both health behavior
change and weight loss (after performance-contingent ﬁnan-
cial incentives were removed). We further predicted (H2)
that ﬁnancial motivation would be unrelated to initiation of
either health behavior change or weight loss.
We also tested two potential moderators of the pre-
dicted undermining of maintenance eﬀects: gender and
socioeconomic status (SES). First, several authors have
previously reported that males report lower trait levels of
autonomy orientation and/or high levels of controlled moti-
vational causality orientation [31–34]. Recently, Hagger and
Chatzisarantis[35]demonstratedthatmotivationalcausality
orientation moderates the undermining eﬀect of rewards
on intrinsic motivation. Thus, we predicted (H3) that
gender would moderate the undermining of maintenance
eﬀects. Second, the economic utility of ﬁnancial intensives is
inverselyrelatedtoincomesorsocioeconomicstatus,assuch,
ﬁnancial incentives may feel more controlling to those low in
SES. Thus, we predicted (H4) that SES would moderate the
undermining of maintenance eﬀects.Journal of Obesity 3
2.MaterialsandMethods
The study design and methods are described in detail in an
open source study protocol paper published in BMC Public
Health [36] and will be described brieﬂy.
2.1. Study Sample. Chicago area adults of ages between 21
and 60 years were recruited through community adver-
tisements. To be eligible, individuals were required to
report all of the following: (a) <5 fruits and vegetables
(FV)/day;(b)>8%caloricintakefromsaturatedfat(Fat),(c)
<60min/day moderate/vigorous physical activity (PA), and
(d) >90min/day targeted sedentary screen time (Sed; televi-
sion, movies, recreational internet use, and videogames). All
procedureswereapprovedbytheInstitutionalReviewBoards
of the University of Illinois at Chicago and Northwestern
University.
2.2.Two-WeekBaselinePhase(andFinalEligibilityScreening).
Candidates who self-reported all four risk behaviors were
screened by a Bachelor level research assistant (coach). The
coach trained participants to accurately estimate and use
a handheld device to record and upload dietary intake,
moderate-vigorous-intensity physical activity, and targeted
recreational sedentary screen time. During the two-week
baseline (run-in) phase, participants wore an accelerometer,
recorded diet and activity on the handheld device, and
submitted data daily to the coach.
2.3. Randomization. Candidates who displayed all four risk
behaviors throughout baseline, as evidenced by handheld
and accelerometer data, were randomized (stratiﬁed by gen-
der) using a computer-generated sequence of randomly per-
muted blocks. The four behavioral intervention groups dif-
fered based on the behaviors that were targeted/incentivized.
Each group was assigned to target a diﬀerent combination
of two behavior goals, one related to diet (FV or Fat) and
one related to activity (PA or Sed): (1) increase FV and PA
(FV↑PA↑), (2) decrease Fat and increase PA (Fat↓PA↑), (3)
increase FV and decrease Sed (FV↑Sed↓), or (4) decrease Fat
and Sed (Fat↓Sed↓).
2.4. Intervention Phase (Initiation). Coaches tailored behav-
ioral strategies based on participants’ baseline data. For
example, those who asked to decrease Fat were shown the
ten foods that supplied their greatest saturated fat grams and
coached to reduce portion size or number for those foods.
For the ﬁrst week of treatment (T ×1), daily diet and activity
goals were set midway between baseline behavior and the
ultimatedailygoal.Fromthesecondtreatmentweekonward,
full goals were set for the two targeted behaviors to which the
participant was randomized: 5 fruit and vegetable servings,
saturated fat intake < 8% of calories, physical activity ≥
60 minutes, or sedentary recreational activity ≤ 90 minutes
per day. Participants were expected to reach their behavioral
targetsduringtreatmentweek2andtomaintainthemduring
week 3. During the three treatment weeks, they uploaded
data daily and communicated as needed with their coaches
via telephone or e-mail, per preference, to problem-solve
around adherence barriers.
2.5.Performance-ContingentFinancialIncentives. Duringthe
3-week intervention phase, participants could earn a $175
incentive for fully meeting goals for both targeted behaviors.
Thus, participants could earn just over $50/week ($175/3)
for meeting their health behavior goals; a relatively small
ﬁnancial incentive in comparison to the amount of time and
eﬀort required for success.
2.6. Follow-Up Phase (Maintenance). To explore the poten-
tial for maintenance of healthy behavior changes, the study
included a 17-week follow-up phase. Immediately after the
intervention phase, participants were informed that attain-
ment of diet and activity targets was no longer required;
payment was now contingent solely upon recording and
transmitting handheld data on a predetermined schedule.
This follow-up phase in this study is analogous to the “free
choice periods” included in many experiments on rewards
andundermining,whereinactivityisconsideredanindicator
of intrinsic or autonomous motivation (i.e., “free-choice
behavior”). Recording was required daily for the ﬁrst week
following treatment, for three consecutive days in post-
treatment weeks two and three, biweekly for the next six
weeks, then monthly until the ﬁnal follow-up. Participants
could earn incrementally larger ﬁnancial incentives (from
$30 to $80) for uploading data during consecutive follow-
ups. All recording-contingent incentives were received at the
e n do ff o l l o w - u p .
2.7.HandheldTool. Participantsusedapersonaldigitalassis-
tanttorecordandself-regulatetheirtargetedbehaviors.They
w e r ei n s t r u c t e dt oc a r r yt h ed e v i c ea n dr e c o r di m m e d i a t e l y
after executing a behavior. During treatment and follow-
up, the handheld device displayed two decision support
feedback“thermometers”—onefordiet(F/VorFat)andone
for activity (PA or Sed). Once activated, goal thermometers
were continually updated in response to data entry. The
goal thermometers also enabled participants to observe the
potential impact of a food or activity choice.
2.8. Measures. Demographic information, anthropometric
data, and motivation for health behavior change were
assessed during screening. Demographic data gathered
include gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, education,
income, and household size. Participants estimated their
annual household income on the following 11-point scale:
$0–15k, $15–20k, $20–25k, $25–30k, $30–35k, $35–40k,
$40–45k, $45–50k, $50–60k, $60–75k, and > $75k.
2.8.1. Financial Motivation. Context-speciﬁc ﬁnancial moti-
vation for participating in the study was measured using
modiﬁed items from the Motives for Physical Activities
Measure [37]. Before answering these questions, the nature
of the study was explained to participants and, speciﬁcally,
the potential for earning performance-contingent ﬁnancial
incentives in exchange for making healthy behavior changes.4 Journal of Obesity
Sevenitemswerealteredtoaskabouteatingaswellasactivity
changes and the degree to which ﬁnancial incentives were a
motive for participating in the study (e.g., “Because I want
to earn extra money”; α = .97). Participants responded on a
7-point Likert scale (1: not at all true for me; 7: very true for
me).
2.8.2. Assessment of Individual Behaviors. Saturated fat and
FV consumption were measured from daily intake record-
ings. To prevent superﬂuous calories (e.g., in sweetened
beverages) from inﬂating the fat gram allowance, the
saturated fat goal for those randomized to decrease Fat
was determined using the Harris-Benedict equation [38]
to estimate calories needed to maintain weight. Minutes of
physical and sedentary activity were measured cumulatively
by an end-of-day 24-hour activity log in which participants
accounted for every 15-minute block of each day.
2.8.3. Composite Diet-Activity Improvement Score. In order
to quantify overall change across four behaviors (FV, Fat, PA,
and Sed), we developed a composite healthy diet and activity
improvement score, weighting each behavior equally. All
variables were transformed to better approximate normality,
using square root transformation for the count outcomes
(FV, PA, and Sed) and arc sine transformation for the
percentage outcome, Fat [39]. To allow direct comparisons
between interventions on these disparately measured vari-
ables, each individual health behavior was standardized
to provide a common metric using a modiﬁed z-score
(where 1 unit represents a 1-standard deviation change),
with higher values representing greater healthy lifestyle
improvement. Z-scores for time points after baseline were
standardized relative to the overall baseline distribution to
reﬂect improvement relative to baseline. To reﬂect the eﬀect
of treatment across multiple health behaviors, the mean of
all four individual z-scores at each time point was calculated,
as recommended [40], to derive a composite index that
expressed each participant’s overall healthy behavior change.
We refer to this as a “composite diet-activity improvement
score.”
2.8.4. Weight. Weight was measured at three times: at
baseline,theendofprescription,andattheendofthefollow-
up phase. A trained staﬀ member weighed participants
(to the nearest 1lb) on a calibrated beam balance scale
withoutshoesandwearinglightclothing.Twomeasureswere
recorded at each visit.
3. Results andDiscussion
3.1. Study Sample. The ﬁnal sample of 204 adults included
48 males, 46.6% minorities, 25% with no more than a high
school education, and mean age 33.3 years (s.d. = 11.01).
Exceptforoneindividual,allparticipantsattainedbehavioral
targets during the 3-week initiation period (thus earning the
$175 performance-contingent incentive); the majority did so
promptly. The median time taken to achieve consumption of
ﬁve FV was nine days (i.e., two days after the full ﬁve FV goal
wasset).ThemediantimetakentoattaineachoftheSed,Fat,
and PA targets was eight days (i.e., one day after the targeted
amount was set as a goal).
3.2. Group Eﬀects. Group eﬀects have been reported pre-
viously [41]. The primary ﬁnding was that the group
assigned to FV↑Sed↓ produced signiﬁcantly greater change
in composite diet-activity improvement score after the 3-
week intervention phase, relative to the other three groups
(FV↑PA↑,F a t ↓PA↑,F a t ↓Sed↓). Further, the FV↑Sed↓ group
maintained this advantage through the end of the 17-week
Follow up Phase.
The eﬀects reported herein related to ﬁnancial motiva-
tion were independent of group assignment. None of the
ﬁnancial motivation x group interactions were signiﬁcant;
thus, all secondary analyses reported in this paper were
conducted collapsing across Groups.
3.3. Financial Motivation→Initiation of Healthy Changes.
Two linear regression models were run regressing initiation
of healthy changes from the baseline phase to the end of the
(incentivized) intervention phase onto ﬁnancial motivation.
Healthy change outcomes were (1) initiation of composite
diet-activity improvement score change and (2) initiation
of weight change (loss). As predicted, ﬁnancial motivation
was unrelated to initiation of healthy change during the
incentivized intervention phase, unrelated to healthy lifestyle
improvement initiation (β =− .10; P = .12), and unrelated
to weight loss initiation (β = .014; P = .19).
3.4. Financial Motivation→Maintenance of Healthy Changes.
Next, two linear regression models were run regressing
maintenance of healthy changes from the baseline phase to
the end of the follow-up phase onto ﬁnancial motivation.
Maintenance of healthy change outcomes was (1) mainte-
nance of composite diet-activity improvement score change
and (2) maintenance of weight change (loss). Financial
motivation was unrelated to maintenance of composite diet-
activity improvement score, β =− .08, P = .23. However,
Financial motivation was negatively related to maintenance
of weight change, β = .034, P = .03; that is, those who were
higher in Financial motivation weighed more on average at
the end of the follow-up phase, after controlling for weight
during the baseline phase (see Table 1 & Figure 1).
3.5. Financial Motivation x Gender → Maintenance of
Healthy Changes. We ran two linear regression models that
tested the interaction between ﬁnancial motivation and
gender predicting change from the baseline phase to the
end of the follow-up phase in terms of (1) maintenance of
composite diet-activity improvement score change and (2)
maintenance of weight change (loss). Gender interacted with
ﬁnancial motivation to predict maintenance of composite
diet-activity improvement score change (β = .17, P = .02),
such that ﬁnancial motivation undermined maintenance
of composite diet-activity improvement score more among
men (see Table 2). The gender by ﬁnancial motivation
interaction did not predict maintenance of weight lossJournal of Obesity 5
Table 1: Regression model predicting weight at the end of follow-
up (maintenance).
B SE β t P-value
Constant 5.40 2.779 1.94 <.05
Financial motivation 1.51 0.705 .034 2.15 <.05
Baseline weight 0.97 0.015 .986 62.44 <.001
Note. The positive β and t statistics associated with ﬁnancial motivation
i m p l yap o s i t i v er e l a t i o nw i t ht o t a lb o d yw e i g h ta tt h ee n do ff o l l o w - u pa n d
thus a negative relation with weight loss from baseline to the end of follow-
up.
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Figure 1: Financial motivation predicting weight change (% of
original body weight). high: top quartile; low: bottom quartile.
Table 2: Regression model predicting composite diet-activity score
(diet-activity) at the end of follow-up (maintenance).
B SE β t P-value
Constant .635 0.069 9.19 <.001
Financial motivation .086 0.071 −.084 −1.21 .23
Gender −.012 0.068 −.012 −0.17 .86
Baseline diet-activity .654 0.115 .404 5.69 <.001
Financial motivation
x Gender .172 0.071 .169 2.42 .016
(β =− .022, P = .139), though the main eﬀect of ﬁnancial
motivation remained signiﬁcant even controlling for this
interaction term.
The gender x ﬁnancial motivation interaction predict-
ing maintenance of composite diet-activity improvement
score is illustrated in Figure 2. Participants in the top and
bottom quartiles with respect to ﬁnancial motivation were
categorized as “high” or “low,” respectively, yielding four
groups.Simpleslopeswerecalculatedforeachgroup:(i)high
ﬁnancial motivation males; t(70) =− 4.15, P<. 001; (ii) low
ﬁnancial motivation males; t(70) =− 2.17, P<. 05; (iii) high
ﬁnancial motivation females; t(70) =− 2.70, P<. 01; (iv)
low ﬁnancial motivation females; t(70) =− 3.51, P = .001.
3.6. Financial Motivation x SES → Maintenance of Healthy
Changes. Werantwolinearregressionmodelsthattestedthe
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Figure 2: Financial motivation x gender predicting composite
diet-activity improvement score. $: ﬁnancial motivation. high: top
quartile; low: bottom quartile.
interaction between ﬁnancial motivation and SES predicting
change from the baseline phase to the end of the follow-
up phase in terms of (1) maintenance of composite diet-
activity improvement score change and (2) maintenance
of weight change (loss). Participants’ estimates of annual
income were negatively skewed; the modal response (28%)
reported an annual household income greater than $75,000.
The interactions between ﬁnancial motivation and income
were not signiﬁcant.
4. Conclusions
In the Make Better Choices Trial, participants were oﬀered
performance-contingent ﬁnancial incentives for making
healthy behavior changes (related to diet and activity) over
the course of three weeks. While ﬁnancial motivation was
unrelated to healthy behavior or weight change during this
3-week initiation or intervention phase, after performance-
contingentﬁnancialincentiveswereremoved(andaftera17-
week follow-up phase), ﬁnancial motivation was negatively
related to weight loss maintenance. Financial motivation
was also negatively associated with maintenance of healthy
behaviorchangesamongmen,moresothanforwomen.This
research represents, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst
evidence for the undermining eﬀect within the context of
an intensive healthy lifestyle intervention. Furthermore, past
research on the undermining eﬀect has typically involved lab
experiments with relatively small samples, rewards admin-
istered at a single time point, short follow-up periods, and
behaviors with high levels of baseline intrinsic motivation.
This research is among the ﬁrst to provide evidence for
the undermining eﬀect in a study with a relatively large
sample (n = 204), an extended incentivization period
(3 week), an extended follow-up period (17 weeks), and
behaviors for which there was only modest levels of intrinsic
or autonomous motivation at baseline.
Based on the self-determination theory (SDT), the
reason that ﬁnancial incentives have the potential to under-
mine autonomous motivation, and thus maintenance after6 Journal of Obesity
being removed, is that incentives are often experienced as
subtly controlling. A meta-analysis of studies related to the
undermining eﬀect found that this is especially true of
tangible, performance-contingent incentives [30], as were
used in this study. As noted earlier, a number of studies
have found that men tend to have a more controlling (and
less autonomous) orientation to the world, in general [31–
34]. Recently, Hagger and Chatzisarantis [35] demonstrated
that these same causality orientations can moderate the
undermining eﬀect of rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Speciﬁcally, in the context of a lab experiment, the authors
foundthatcontrol-orientedparticipantsassignedtoareward
condition exhibited signiﬁcantly lower levels of intrinsic
motivation (less time spent on a puzzle activity during a free
choice period) compared to those assigned to a no reward
condition: a replication of the classic undermining eﬀect.
In contrast, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in intrinsic
motivation levels between reward conditions for autonomy-
oriented participants. Hagger and Chatzisarantis interpret
theirﬁndingsasindicationthatautonomy-orientedcausality
orientation protects individuals from the undermining eﬀect
of rewards on intrinsic motivation. We oﬀer a similar,
speculative interpretation for the ﬁnancial motivation by
gender interaction observed in the present study. That is, we
suspect that females in our sample tended towards a more
autonomy-oriented causality orientation, which protected
them from the undermined maintenance of healthy behavior
changes that males in our sample exhibited. Because the
present study involved secondary analysis of data, measures
of motivational orientation were not included. A future
study might test this interpretation by measuring global
causality orientation and investigating whether the ﬁnancial
motivation by gender interaction remains signiﬁcant after
controlling for a ﬁnancial incentive by causality orien-
tation interaction term (i.e., mediated moderation [42,
43]). Related follow-up research might investigate further
individual diﬀerences and contextual factors relating to the
interpretation or experience of ﬁnancial incentives in an
intensive lifestyle intervention.
Another useful direction for future research would
be more studies of intensive lifestyle interventions that
experimentally vary the way ﬁnancial incentives are framed.
Prior work has already demonstrated in lab settings that
diﬀerent reward contingencies and interpersonal contexts
each inﬂuence intrinsic motivation by virtue of inﬂuencing
the interpretation of rewards [30, 44]. One might argue
that a limitation of this study pertains to the correlational
(versus experimental) nature of the data. Correlational data,
and cross-sectional designs in particular, make it diﬃcult to
draw causal inferences. It is important to consider, however,
that using experimental designs to investigate the potential
for undermining in the context of healthy behavior change
intervention may pose ethical challenges. In the case of
behaviorstypicallystudiedinthelab(e.g.,Somapuzzles),the
cost of undermining intrinsic motivation into the future is
relatively low. The beneﬁt to science gained from conducting
such experiments typically outweighs the cost of potentially
reducing participants’ enjoyment of Soma puzzles. The
ethical ramiﬁcations of turning a participant oﬀ to healthy
eating and/or physical activity in the future are far more
serious; thus, more consideration must be exercised on the
part of researchers, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
are more likely to raise concerns.
Despite these challenges, it is our position that more
research on the issue of ﬁnancial incentives and potential
undermining in health behavior interventions is sorely
needed. At their best, ﬁnancial incentives may be a useful
tool in helping people initiate healthy habits, or even
grow to enjoy healthy behaviors. A number of studies
have recently demonstrated that oﬀering small ﬁnancial
incentives increase enrollment and reduce disparities by
encouraging otherwise underrepresented groups to enroll in
both physical activity and weight loss interventions, thereby
enhancing intervention reach [45–47]. Furthermore, the
high potential value of research in this area can also be
explained by the fact that ﬁnancial incentives are already
being widely used in health behavior interventions. As noted
earlier, one survey of large US employers found that over
70% of employee wellness programs were using ﬁnancial
incentives to encourage participation and/or performance
in 2008; this represented an increase from 62% in 2007
[1], and the World Health Organization has recommended
using rewards in obesity treatment, speciﬁcally [2]. Popular
consumerwebsites,suchasstickk.com,havealsocontributed
to making ﬁnancial incentives for healthy behavior changes
an increasingly routine practice. As a result of this existing
infrastructure, research that illuminates the use of ﬁnancial
incentives can have a swift, signiﬁcant, and positive impact
on public health.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings from this study demonstrate
that ﬁnancial incentives have the potential to undermine
successful maintenance in an intensive lifestyle intervention.
Speciﬁcally,participantswhoreportedbeingmoremotivated
by the MBC intervention’s ﬁnancial incentives were worse
oﬀ in terms of their diet and activity (among men), and
their body weight (men and women) at the end of a 17-
week follow up period. Our interpretation of these ﬁndings
is that ﬁnancial incentives, when overemphasized, have the
potential to be interpreted as controlling, thereby undermin-
ing autonomous motivation and subsequent maintenance
of targeted health behaviors. Researchers and practitioners
who are planning to use ﬁnancial incentives in health
behavior interventions may do well to consider framing
those incentives in ways that are autonomy supportive and
investing resources in the collection of follow-up data to
investigatebehavioralmaintenanceafterincentiveshavebeen
removed.
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